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Abstract 
 
It has become something of a truism that organisational and political environments are 
internationalised, and that policy making is informed at least in part by increased understanding of 
what takes place in parallel domains and jurisdictions.  Leaders and policy makers learn about, 
from and with their counterparts elsewhere.  By the same token, the international meeting, 
workshop or seminar has become a more prominent part of professional, organisational and 
political routines. 
 
This paper asks simply: what do we learn by meeting?  While both learning and meeting can be 
readily dismissed as operations of a crude construction of power, the paper is interested in what 
might remain.  It is notable, for example, that international encounters are often highly valued by 
participants, albeit in ways they find difficult to express.  What do participants experience in 
meeting, and what do they know differently as a result? 
 
Drawing on seminal work by Margeret Mead and others, and using ethnographic and 
documentary methods, the paper describes processes of introduction, presentation, recognition, 
confusion, socialisation, communication and reporting.  Conceived as a microstudy of purportedly 
macrolevel activity, it is meant both as an exercise in analytic interpretation and as a resource for 
participants and practitioners. 
 
 
 
policy, learning and meeting 
 
Policy makers have always been interested in learning from others, and policy scientists have 
always been interested in learning how they do so.  Much of the business of policy makers is to 
interact with others in other domains (other departments, organizations, sectors, levels and 
countries), and many of those interactions have as their purpose the acquisition and exchange of 
knowledge.  Meanwhile, opportunities for such interaction, especially across national borders, 
appear to have increased.  What Giddens has observed of business and the academy holds for 
policy, too: 'With the advent of the new technologies… people go to more conferences rather than 
less.  You still need to look into the eyes of the other' (Giddens, in Giddens and Pierson 1998, p 
51). 
 
The learning component of these interactions has been understood in different ways, conforming 
broadly to the established paradigms of social and political science (Freeman 2006a, 2007).  A 
rationalist approach takes learning to be instrumental, motivated by a wish or need to do better 
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somehow.  It posits the existence or possibility of lessons that might be learned, where the 
validity and authority of a lesson turns on the means by which it is produced (Rose 1993, 2005).  
It assumes, essentially, that policy might be taken as a specific cause with a specific effect, where 
the relationship between the two is transferable to other instances of a problem.  Further, 
knowledge about a problem, and about this relationship between policy cause and policy effect, is 
distinct from doing something about that problem: knowledge is produced by scientific or quasi-
scientific method in one domain and applied in another.  'Truth' exists somewhere, and is spoken 
to 'power' somewhere else.  This, of course, is the basis for some of the stronger claims made for 
the relevance or applicability of comparative policy studies. 
 
Institutionalist approaches note that learning is invariably limited by the availability of information 
and opportunity.  The rationality of the policy maker is 'bounded' in significant ways (Simon 1991).  
New information tends to disrupt organizational routine, while part of the function of organization 
is control the flow of information into a system from its environment (Salaman 2001).  Only certain 
kinds of information are either acquired or required, and are then interpreted and processed 
according to established practice and structures of belief (Heclo 1974, Sabatier 1988).  Learning 
proceeds according to a logic of appropriateness as much as efficiency (March and Olsen 1984): 
in this way, it comes to be about the adaptation as much as the adoption of new policy. 
 
A constructionist account of policy learning focuses on the way problems come to be understood 
as such, on the process of framing solutions to them and the problematization of each in the 
process of implementation (Schön 1973, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Learning is iterative, 
carried by exchanges in and among groups (Hall 1989, 1993; Wenger 1998, 2000).  To the extent 
that we learn from others, we learn only according to our own understandings and interpretations 
of what they do: we must necessarily invent or imagine what we learn, and we import and 
reconstruct problems as well as policies and their consequences.  Problems, policies and 
solutions remain uncertain, opportunities for interpretation, negotiation and coordination, both 
separately and together. 
 
In all this, however, learning remains elusive.  This it has in common with decision making and 
with policy transfer more generally (Parsons 1995, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  We know of its 
inputs and outputs, much less of its processes.  Learning is postulated theoretically in different 
ways, but difficult to observe or describe.  Where, when and exactly how does it happen?  What 
is the set of tasks policy makers engage in which both we and they redescribe as learning?  The 
claim made here is very simple: if we want to go looking for learning, we might go to meetings.  In 
general, of course, we learn by doing - but for many of us meetings are what we do.  How does 
learning by meeting take place, and what does it consist of?  But before we begin, we must ask 
what we mean by meeting. 
 
what is a meeting? 
 
A meeting, as described here, is a pre-arranged opportunity for purposive communication.  It can 
be categorised on two dimensions: whether its denominator is an issue or a set of actors, and 
whether participation is open or closed.
1
  A meeting might bring together a range of actors to 
address a common problem as, for example, a public hearing does.  Alternatively, it might bring 
together a set of actors with some shared identity, such as members of a department or team, to 
discuss a range of issues of common concern.  Meetings can be openly advertised to anyone 
who chooses to come, or they can be by invitation only.  One way of operating this kind of closure 
is by restricting attendance to members of a society or defined professional group, in the manner 
of an annual conference.  Most meetings can be placed somewhere between the two poles of 
each axis. 
 
                                                     
1
 This schema is adapted from Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), pp 53ff: 'The nature of the 
analytical forum'. 
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What I have in mind here more specifically are meetings of people from different countries who 
have come together, often for a few days, to discuss some aspect of policy or practice.  
Participants, though they might not all be professionals, otherwise share the characteristics of 
Haas's epistemic community: 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue-area' (Haas 1992, p 3).  Though they might not all be public officials, they 
are engaged in what Keohane and Nye call 'transgovernmental relations', or 'sets of direct 
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by 
the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments' (Keohane and Nye 1974).  I 
focus on international meetings, not least because they are what I know (see method, below).  
But my assumption is also that the international encounter throws ordinary or domestic problems 
of exchange and learning into greater relief.  Finally, because my interest is in learning, I am not 
thinking of meetings held for the purpose of negotiation or conflict resolution nor in the first place 
for decision making.  
 
Such meetings typically go under the name of conferences, seminars and workshops.
2
  What 
Margaret Mead and Paul Byers (1968, p 5) call the 'small substantive conference' means 'a group 
small enough to sit around one large table, called together for a specific purpose, at a specific 
place, for a limited time, once, or at specified intervals in a series of designated length to consider 
new aspects of a specified topic.  All members of such a conference are accorded participant 
status; the method of communication is mutual multisensory interchange with speech as the 
principal medium…'  Each meeting is unique (and exactly why it is unique should become clear in 
the course of this paper), but it will also have some elements in common with other meetings.  
Participants gather, are introduced, and an agenda set; issues are tabled and papers presented; 
discussion follows, often in smaller groups; summaries are made and shared, proceedings are 
reported. 
 
understanding meeting 
 
Writing in the 1960s of experience reaching back to the 1940s and 1950s, Mead and Byers could 
call the small conference a 'new social invention', a 'new form of communication' (1968, p 3).  
They find its sources in politics and learning respectively: in the essentially political practice of 
collective discussion and decision making, instantiated around camp fires, in village meetings, 
ecclesiastical councils, parliaments and courts, and in scholarly traditions of public presentation, 
discussion and debate as well as ultimately Socratic teaching methods, especially as used with 
advanced students. 
 
More generally, not much is made of meetings in the public policy and related literature.  
Seemingly mundane and certainly more 'micro' than many other disciplinary concerns, they 
appear to have been 'black-boxed' along with other artefacts and infrastructures of policy making 
such as documents, budgets and, until recently, other kinds of policy instrument.  Meetings have 
some place in the study of international relations, mostly in respect of negotiation and conflict 
resolution.
3, 4
  They remain important to the normative constructions of political theory, as in 
                                                     
2
 On the more specific forms of scenario workshops and consensus conferences, see Andersen 
and Jfger (1999). In some ways, the kind of meeting I am thinking of might be described as a 
policy version of the Balint group (Balint 1957), in which accounts of their practice given by 
individual professionals are discussed with and by their peers. 
3
 See, for example, Galtung (1964), who takes the nature and frequency of summit meetings as 
an indicator of international (East-West) relations; Jacobson (1964) on test-ban negotiations; 
Schlaim (1997) on the secret plotting of British, French and Israeli diplomats against Egypt in 
1956.  Cohen and Azar (1981) report a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli intellectuals which took 
place in Cairo in May 1979, and are principally concerned with the images one side had of the 
other.  Donnelly (1988) presents a quantitative analysis of the allocation of meeting time to 
human rights issues in UN bodies, while Karns (1977) finds that attending interparliamentary 
meetings increased internationalist attitudes among US Congress members.  Hanieh's 'Camp 
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Habermasian conceptions of deliberative democracy and communicative action, which privilege 
ordered, reasoned argument made in face-to-face encounters.
5
  In analytic terms, nevertheless, 
we might think of the meeting as a group, an institution or a system.   
 
Understandings of groups tend to deny processes of learning in pointing to the need for stability.  
Following Bion (1961, pp 63-64), 'The basic assumption is that people come together as a group 
for purposes of preserving the group… [this] conflicts very sharply with the idea of a group met 
together to do a creative job.'  The group is maintained by overcoming conflict within it, and the 
point of studying it is to uncover the ways in which differences of race, gender and occupational 
status – among others - are erased.  As Abercrombie suggests, 'The word "group" has so many 
connotations of "mass", "herd", "crowd", "clique", "team", that it is easy to think that any form of 
organized group behaviour involves the subjugation of the individual' (Abercrombie 1989, p 80). 
 
Thinking of the meeting as an institution is to understand what goes on there as a function of the 
different roles of its participants and the rules by which they interact.  Either may be formal and 
explicit, or informal and implicit.  In a committee, for example, participants will be officers (chair, 
secretary) or members; they may proceed formally, as in voting, or informally, by turn-taking as 
they contribute to discussion.  Lester and Piore (2004) take the cocktail party (a special kind of 
meeting) as a metaphor for what managers do: a good host will choose guests, get a 
conversation going and intervene periodically to keep it going, refreshing both conversation and 
guests as they need.  He or she will identify initial common ground, encourage one or other 
partner to offer something, whether information or observation, and will be careful to counteract 
any initial miscommunication or misunderstanding.
6
 
 
Systems theory, meanwhile, is that way of thinking about collective processes which prioritises 
information and communication.
7
  In these terms, the meeting is an exercise in 'distributed 
cognition' (Giere and Moffatt 2003), understood as both a scientific and social process, or in 
'sensemaking' (Weick 1995).
8
  This is consistent with Haas's (1992) account of the role of the 
epistemic community, which turns on a degree of uncertainty in policy making, on the need for 
interpretation of inadequate or complicated and sometimes contradictory information, and on a 
corollary requirement to stabilise and sustain the flow of information and interpretation to policy 
makers.
9
  Understandings of complex systems, in turn, have come to cast the process of 
communication as generative, and systems as in some sense creating both themselves and their 
environments. 
 
this paper 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
David Papers' (2001) provide a first-hand account of the July 2000 meeting between 
representatives of the US, Palestine and Israel. 
4
 In similar vein, and among few such accounts in public policy, Webber (1998) considers a 
council of ministers meeting in Brussels in 1993 essentially concerned with trade negotiations 
(the Uruguay round of the GATT). 
5
 For the application of ideas about communicative action to international relations, see Risse 
(2000, 2004).  Their particular relevance here is in defining a mode of interaction distinct from 
interest-based bargaining on one hand and rule-guided behaviour on the other (Risse 2000, p 1). 
6
 Lester and Piore (2004), ch 3: 'Conversation, interpretation and ambiguity'. 
7
 For a simple but powerful exposition of the idea of communication as an interaction process and 
human relationships as systems, see Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson (1967); also Arrow, 
McGrath and Berdahl (2000).  Medd (2002) describes meetings between representatives of 
different agencies concerned in different ways with a social welfare project in these terms. 
8
 For an organization, meetings 'create the infrastructure which creates sense' (Weick 1995, p 
144). 
9
 'The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is simple. The major dynamics are uncertainty, 
interpretation, and institutionalization' (Haas 1992, p 3). 
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This paper in no way denies the possibility of writing a largely negative and perfectly valid 
account of meetings, one which attends principally to issues of power, status, and interest.  But 
nor does it deny the possibility of learning.  I am concerned here with learning as a specific 
aspect of meeting, one I think eternally present if often obscured.  If there is learning in meetings, 
how does it happen? 
 
The paper is organised as set of abstract elements, reflecting the underlying logic or 
hermeneutics of what goes on in meetings.  This logic is also more or less a chronology, 
reflecting the way in which a meeting (like learning) is ordered, sequential, progressive: the 
communicative aspect of the meeting passes from articulation through perception, socialisation, 
construction and resolution.
10
  That is not to say that things will invariably take place in this order, 
or that there isn't much that is going on simultaneously.  Not all elements will be present at every 
meeting, and at every meeting much more goes on than I take account of here.  The paper is 
quite deliberately a partial account, focused on what is learned in and by meeting to the exclusion 
of other social processes.  It seeks to identify the learning aspect of meeting in order to uncover 
the meeting (or social and interactive) aspect of learning, and vice versa.   
 
At the same time, too, its analytic intent allows for a normative effect.  For if we are to make 
meetings work, we need to understand what it might mean for them to work.  So this paper is for 
participants as much as for social and political scientists, and its purpose is to help them 
understand what it is they are part of.  To this extent, it responds to recent calls for increased 
reflexivity in public administration (Cunliffe and Jun 2005).  It is not meant as a manual or set of 
instructions - such a manual would be counter to the spirit of what follows - but as a resource for 
thinking.
11
  To the extent that what is being developed here is an ideal type, it is one which has 
both analytic and pragmatic functions.  Following Weber, the ideal type is not only useful in 
forming a scientific appreciation of the world, but is something actors use in making sense of the 
world they encounter and must negotiate (Hekman 1983). 
 
The paper draws variously on a secondary literature in several fields.  A number of examples of 
meetings are taken from published reports, and presented as vignettes in the text (indented, in 
italics).  The paper also reflects my experience of cross-national research in health and public 
policy, of participation in international research programmes, and of research and consultancy in 
international public health.  Some of that experience is recorded in field notes and is cited as 
such.  For the rest, and like any qualitative account, this one will convince or otherwise by virtue 
of its authenticity, plausibility and criticality: that is, by whether the report of what respondents say 
and how they say it seem realistic to readers; by the face validity of the commentary and 
conclusions offered, and by whether they challenge the reader to think critically and anew about 
what might otherwise be a taken-for granted aspect of administrative experience (Golden-Biddle 
and Locke 1993; Brower, Abolafia and Carr 2000). 
 
 
1 articulation 
 
We meet in order to talk.  The first phase of meeting is of some initial articulation, a combination 
of introduction and presentation, of saying something about oneself and to someone else.  
'Articulation', in this sense, carries meanings of both expression and connection. 
 
Introductions are crucial because they create identities.  Sometimes we know some other 
participants in a meeting, often rather well; many we meet for the first time.  The interaction 
                                                     
10
 Compare Corey and Corey (1997; cit Ettorre 2000), who identify five stages of work in groups: 
a formation stage characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty; an initial stage of developing 
trust; a transition stage of anxiety and some resistance; a working stage of communication and 
collaboration, and an ending stage of sadness and concern. 
11
 For such a guide, see Jay (1976) and CMPS (2003), as well as Mead and Byers (1968). 
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between different kinds of other participant, and the reconstruction of those categories as those 
participants get to know each other, is the essence of meeting.  'Presentation', meanwhile, 
implies gift-giving, a pattern of reciprocal obligations.  It begins an exchange, often a process of 
question-and-answer, assuming and inviting some response.  Each paper or presentation, each 
comment made during discussion, makes a connection with others in the room, and with what 
they have to say. 
 
introduction 
 
Meetings usually begin by introducing participants to each other.  Sometimes we are introduced 
to others by a third party, and sometimes we introduce ourselves.  Either way, we hear a version 
of who we are, constructed in such a way as to make us relevant or meaningful to whoever we 
are being introduced to.  The introduction establishes a connection between us; properly, it 
formalises and specifies the connection we have by virtue of being at the same meeting. 
 
After breakfast on the first day, a quarter of an hour had been left for 'introductions'.  The 
meeting was concerned with the relationship between research and policy, and most 
participants had worked in the worlds of both research and politics or public administration.  
They introduced themselves.  They took cues from each other, connected what a previous 
speaker had said with some aspect of their own experience, realising how much they had 
done was relevant to the topic in hand (realising, in fact, who they were).  In the event, the 
'introductions' item took more than an hour, ending only because later speakers understood 
that in order to rescue the timetable they had to abbreviate what they now thought they had 
to say.  The next two days were taken up with more formal presentations and small group 
discussion.  But it was clear from that first hour that sufficient autobiographical material was 
available to sustain a perhaps different, but equally valid and valuable kind of meeting.
12
 
 
Introduction can seem both burdensome and liberating: who am I, actually?  What do I do?  What 
do you need to know about me in order to understand what I do and why I'm here?  As a public 
official and former activist wondered about cross-national exchanges, 'Who are we when we go 
there?'.
13
  An Institute Director with a wealth of experience in organising and attending 
international meetings and seminars says simply that 'People need to know why they've been 
invited'.  What's interesting about this is that it stops short of defining the purpose of the meeting 
in any authoritative way. Instead, it finds that purpose in the identity, interests and experience of 
participants. 
 
presentation 
 
Meetings regularly begin with an introductory paper.  This usually offers definitions of the issue 
with which the meeting is concerned, and often some variants on them.  It raises questions and at 
the same time – implicitly or explicitly – closes off others.  It represents an attempt at a 
'preliminary stabilisation' of the discussion as it begins.  It contains the discussion it provokes; it 
'frames' the meeting; it sets the scene against which participants are to tell their own stories. 
 
The case studies which often follow provide information, tell stories about what happened where 
and why.  They constitute the base material for discussion.  But note in passing that writing and 
presenting a case study is in itself a learning experience.  The case is not self-evident, but has to 
be researched, reflected on, formulated and articulated.  That is to say that we learn about our 
own practice in describing it to others, in constructing it in new ways for new audiences.  A 'case 
study' makes a case or situation newly available for reflection even by those who took part in it.  
Description is already discovery. 
 
                                                     
12
 field note, 24 April 2003. 
13
 interview, 27 September 2002. 
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Articulations are multiple, successive.  Even in the most straightforward instance, a report is 
drafted or a paper written, then adapted as it is made into a presentation, then translated again as 
it is spoken or delivered, then again as it is summarised and commented on, perhaps by a 
rapporteur and then in more fragmented ways by participants.  Each shift in form or mode of 
communication is a translation, an occasion for reflection on and interrogation (which often 
means clarification and simplification) of the story which the author/presenter is trying to tell. 
 
 
2 perception 
 
Meeting both presumes and finds common ground.  It is a process of seeing, identifying and 
sorting similarity and difference.  The meeting establishes an 'axis of recognition', which is 
bidirectional and both political and epistemological: we recognise others' right to be present and 
to (re)present what they do, just as they do to us.  But as they speak, we recognise unimagined 
aspects of their situation and unthought of dimensions and implications of our own. 
 
But the meeting is a process not only of recognising but also of being confused: it is a source 
both of affirmation and of disorientation and discomfort.  This is because, while information, as 
Bateson put it, is 'a difference which makes a difference' (1973a, p 315), learning must denote 
'change of some kind' (Bateson 1973b, p 283).  That change is both exciting and difficult, 
seductive and threatening, a source of anxiety as well as of creativity.
14
 
 
recognition 
 
Sometimes participants take the opportunity to say something simply because it needs to be said 
(and heard and recognised by others).  This kind of learning, gained in the articulation of 
immediate, personal experience, is available only because people are meeting rather than 
reading papers in journals. 
 
In 1999, the US Commission on Civil Rights published a report, 'The Health Care Challenge: 
Acknowledging Disparity, Confronting Discrimination and Ensuring Equality'.  Unusually, the 
document 'makes extensive use of direct quotations from individuals speaking in the first-
person, as well as specific anecdotes from published documents and government 
memoranda.  Often a section of text is preceded by one of these quotations in italics.  This 
device mimics the legal device of taking testimony from witnesses, and not incidentally, also 
the religious tradition of bearing witness to important life-changing events.' 
15
 
 
To the extent that we meet to talk, listening is as essential to the process as speaking.  John 
Forester (1989) defines listening as giving active, close, even intimate attention, distinguishing it 
from hearing, which is more passive, formal and distant.  It is 'an everyday and deeply political 
form of praxis' (Forester 1989, p 113).  Where the object of hearing is what is said, of listening it 
is the speaker or person who is saying.  Listening is interpretive, questioning; most importantly it 
is manifest, and as such inhibits illusion and evasion on the part of the speaker: 
 
'You were listening to me in such a way that I started listening to myself.''
16
 
 
This sentence was said following her presentation by a doctor to an international group of other 
doctors.  It comments acutely, if perhaps only half-consciously, on the sometimes revelatory 
nature of meeting.  
 
                                                     
14
 See, similarly, Abercrombie (1989), ch 11: 'On suffering change'. 
15
 Gamble, V N and Stone, D (2003) 'Reducing health inequities through research and action: 
lessons from the United States', draft paper 
16
 field note, 25 September 2003. 
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Of course, papers, presentations and case studies are interesting in and of themselves, engaging 
because they seem to deal with how things really are, treating of characters, situations and 
stories with which we can identify.  What we recognise in them are similarities with the way we 
think and act, as well as things which are different or new.  Learning about others' work practices 
and organisational affairs offers us an escape from habit and routine, from the mindset that 
unconsciously shapes what we think and do.  The experience gives a new sense of possibility, of 
what life might be like – for better or worse - or how things might be done differently. 
 
In 2001, two of the co-founders of the Boston Women's Health Book Collective attended a 
meeting of groups from around the world who were engaged in translating and adapting Our 
Bodies, Ourselves for use in their own countries.  One participant was surprised to find that 
the Boston group had faced censorship and religious restriction.  For her part, one of the 
original co-authors said that, 'As I listened to their stories of truly daunting conditions – war, 
political opposition, lack of funds, lack of time, inadequate and unreliable technology, and 
dozens of other obstacles – I was strongly moved.  I felt there was really no comparison 
between what we have gone through to produce OBOS… and what so many of them have 
been going through… I felt very privileged to have been there'.
17
 
 
Polanyi's (1966) distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is useful here.
 
 Because, for so 
much of the time, knowledge is embedded in action, practice and experience, it is difficult to 
articulate and reflect on, to make available for exchange and transfer.  Often, it simply goes 
unnoticed or unknown.  Any contrast, any encounter with different ways of doing things, and 
especially the cross-national encounter, exposes tacit knowledge for what it is and makes it 
available for communication and learning. 
 
confusion 
 
Any meeting, like many of the participants at any given meeting, has its Babel moment.  A 
meeting is a confluence of languages, including those of different disciplinary and occupational 
groups as well as of different countries. 
 
Henry Smith reflects on a meeting of the International Psychoanalytical Association: 'First day 
at the Congress is like arriving in a country where you thought you knew the language, only 
to discover that there is no language but, rather, an endless series of tribal dialects'.  He 
reports a colleague's remarks that 'I can't make any sense of it and I don't know why.  You 
wonder, is it your hearing?… The translation?… The speaker?… Your own stupidity?… It is 
demoralising'.
18
 
 
Meetings suddenly become embroiled in conflicts over the definition and meaning of what were 
formerly for most participants the most routine, mundane, habitual terms – often up to and 
including whatever is the nominal topic of discussion.  Cross-national communication is 
characterised by an insistent problematisation of its proper object, a wondering and questioning 
'what it is we're talking about'.  This, of course, is the premise of Schütz's classic study of the 
stranger: '(T)he cultural pattern of the approached group is to the stranger not a shelter but a field 
of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument 
for disentangling problematic situations, but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master' 
(Schütz 1944, p 506). 
 
However, Mead and Byers (1968, p 39) note that 'The pessimism and despair that sets in about a 
quarter of the way through a conference is also functional', in that it requires some effort of 
reflection and communication by and among participants to overcome.  In this way, the concept of 
'moment' ('Babel moment', above), derived from physics, is meant as a dynamic as well as a 
                                                     
17
 News from the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, Fall/Winter 2001, p 11. 
18
 Smith, H (2000) 'Towards an international dialogue. North American reflections on the Santiago 
Congress', International Journal of Psychoanalysis 81 307- 312; p 307. 
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point in time.  In Weick's terms (Weick 1995), the meeting is a crucible of sensemaking, and the 
international meeting is such a rich source of sensemaking because it is the point at which a 
number of often very different languages and codes intersect and interact.  Some of that sense 
making takes place between sessions, in essentially social interaction, as the next section 
explains. 
 
 
3 socialisation 
 
The meeting is a social form, an ensemble of both formal and informal encounters.  Participants 
assume particular social roles, while others they might usually occupy are suspended.  One or 
more individuals, usually on behalf an institution, act as hosts, for example.  A host is not always 
fully participant, because he or she is concerned that everybody's found the hotel, can operate 
the powerpoint projector, collects their expenses claim form.  Similarly, the guest is never quite 
sure what's going on, what might happen next, or where the toilets are. 
 
In important respects, and more under some arrangements than others, the meeting has the 
significant effect of status levelling.  Mead and Byers (1968, p 4) note the assumption of 
'temporary parity' among participants, who are equal at least in their status as invitees.  The 
professor sits beside the graduate student, the international economist with the community 
activist.  The purpose of this section of the paper is to show that the meeting is both social and 
situated, and that both aspects are intrinsic to its learning function.
19
 
 
situation 
 
The meeting is a social situation.  Its dynamics are expressed physically, in spatial, temporal and 
material terms.  For the majority of participants, the international meeting takes place away from 
home, in a country other than their own.  But the conference becomes a world of its own in which 
participants lose their ordinary sense of time and place.  The meeting takes place somewhere in 
which it is no longer Thursday or November, but the afternoon session on day 2.  The effect can 
be liberating as well as disorienting.  Some participants will feel exposed in an unfamiliar 
environment, some will find sanctuary from the pressures and uncertainties they must deal with at 
home. 
 
Compare the western educational ideal, the ancient university, in which, typically, students live 
apart from the world and in their own time: they live in self-contained communities or colleges, 
and work in weeks and terms, the names and times of which bear no relation to any other social 
institution (Rustin 1994).  Think, too, of Dewey's (1897) concept of the school as 'simplified social 
life'. 
 
And then think how the meeting is organised around, effectively identified with a table.
20
  In 
wanting to convene a meeting, we talk about  'getting people round a table'.  What is the 
significance of the table in this context?  Hannah Arendt thought of the table as placed 'between 
those who have it in common'; it 'relates and separates men at the same time' (Thévenot 2002). 
 
sociality 
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 'Social learning' and 'situated learning' are theories of knowledge acquisition which emphasise 
learning in context and through interaction and collaboration (Bandura 1977, Lave and Wenger 
1991, Wenger 1998). 
20
 Similarly, Foucault (1980, p 8) describes how the table constitutes the social relations of the 
court.  Abercrombie (1971) discusses the negotiations over how the tables were to be arranged 
for the Vietnam peace talks. 
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Keohane and Nye (1974) report a comment made about INTERPOL: 'What's really important 
here are the meetings on a social level – the official agenda is only for show'. 
 
The meeting is also, obviously, a social situation.  Ordinary breaks in meetings have to do with 
refreshment; larger or longer conferences have full-scale social programmes.  But these are not 
interruptions of the learning process: it is over coffee, in the bar, on the coach to the theatre - in 
informal, ad hoc, pairwise encounters and smaller groups - that contacts are made and 
reinforced, trust emerges and uncertainties are shared, judgements offered and opinions 
revised.
21
 
 
Most breaks are for eating and drinking.  Hirschman (1998) discusses the significance of eating 
together, or 'commensality'.  He draws on Simmel's Soziologie der Mahlzeit (meal) of 1910, 
noting that what is in essence a physiologically primitive function performed by individuals is in 
practice realised in something more elevated, complex and social.  'While they are consuming 
food and drink, people gathering for the Mahlzeit engage in conversation and discussion, 
exchange information and points of view, tell stories, perform religious services and so on'.  
Hirschman connects the social organisation of the meal with the organisation of the Greek polis.  
While the ancient Greek banquet has its origins in religious sacrifice, sharing in eating comes to 
define a political community.  'All those who eat become citizens… The city emerges because it 
eats beef'.
22
  As does the meeting, however many vegetarian options are taken. 
 
And where there's eating there's sex.  We should account for the erotics of meeting, too.  What is 
international is also exotic, exciting, enticing.  The cross-national meeting is a space outside time 
or sequence where habitual social roles are suspended and no-one quite knows what the rules 
are; it should be no surprise that all kinds of communion take place there. 
 
She talks about the research she is doing in psychology, investigating learning styles.  She is 
all correlations and hypotheses.  I say I'm investigating the equivalent of learning styles in 
government.  Her brow furrows as she wonders whether I've misunderstood or she has.  
Then light in her eyes as I elaborate, and she makes sense.  A smile of recognition, of 
connection, in some way of seduction.
23
 
 
There's more to be said, but perhaps not here.  For now, note only that the experience is fed by 
the buzz of recognition, understanding, communication - what Barthes called 'the thrill of 
meaning' - which the meeting is designed to foster and support.
24
 
 
 
4 construction 
 
The meeting builds up and is built up out of myriad interactions.  What we think of as learning is 
constructed from – consists in – sets of communications.  In this way, the process of learning is 
expressed in the developing language of the meeting. 
 
The Four Country Conference was an annual seminar attended by health policy makers and 
academic researchers from the US and Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
between 1995 and 2005.  Derived in turn from an earlier series of meetings held at Ditchley 
House in England in the early 1990s, the Four Country Conferences expressed a need 'to 
continue regular debate, to organize this debate around a semipermanent cast, and to 
structure it around the experience of countries where comparison made intellectual sense'.  
Its organisers reflect on 'the build-up of understanding of the perspectives of others that went 
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 Note that the very word 'symposium' comes from the Greek, meaning 'drinking together'. 
22
 Durand (1926), cited by Schmitt Pantel (1992) and then by Hirschman (1998, p 22). 
23
 field note, 21 September 2003. 
24
 'le frisson du sens' (Barthes 1977, p 97). 
   11
beyond standard international meetings.  One cannot emphasise this point too much.  The 
accumulation of factual knowledge, shared understanding of basic concepts and mutual trust 
(even while allowing for diverging views and perspectives) that the repeated meetings have 
permitted are rare features of the international trade of ideas in health care'.
25
 
 
communication 
 
As the meeting proceeds, presentations are made and discussed in turn.  The first purpose of 
questions is to clarify what has been said, to deepen the effects of articulation, of recognition, and 
to reduce those of confusion described above.   To the extent that each participant is at different 
times both presenter and listener, cross-national discussion becomes something like a 'mutual 
consultancy'.  For the meeting is a kind of interview, though its structure changes as it 
progresses.  Following a presentation, its author is typically questioned by members of the 
audience.  In more open discussion, observations and assertions are made often without any 
specific addressee.  The meeting is a group interview of a particularly recursive kind: it is an 
interview by a group of the group itself.  What is going on is that the group itself is trying to 
determine what it thinks and knows. 
 
As the discussion proceeds, themes begin to emerge that organise similarities and differences.  
Successive presentations become implicit commentaries on those they follow: discussions come 
to deal not only with the case at hand, but with the accumulation of evidence through a series of 
instances.
26
  This process serves to isolate what is essential in a problem or policy from what is 
circumstantial (note that what is 'essential' here is not something real or pre-ordained, but 
something negotiated by the parties to the discussion).  It involves redefining case material in 
generic terms, noting 'themes'.  This may be by way of reducing the various elements of different 
cases to their lowest common denominator or it may be a process of much more creative 
thinking, a way of seeing things differently. 
 
Interestingly, learning by talking may often be done vicariously.  We gain much by observing or 
fringing on dialogues and exchanges conducted by others.
27
  In this way, being at a meeting is 
sometimes something like a 'cognitive apprenticeship' (Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989).  More 
direct engagement in dialogue, meanwhile, makes for a different order of communication and 
learning.
28
  To begin with, partners to a conversation or dialogue (in effect, a relationship) talk 
about each other, about the things they have brought separately to that situation.  Over time, they 
come to talk increasingly about things they have thought of through their talking; the dialogue 
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 Marmor, T R and Okma, K G H (2000) 'Taking stock and looking forward: what have we 
learned from the Four Country Conferences on Health Care Policies and Health Care Reforms?', 
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Commonwealth Department of Health, p 8, p17, emphasis in original. 
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 'Learning in free group discussion is a process of identifying, through verbalization, the 
associations between schemata, so that the new information can be dissociated from those 
schemata with which it is automatically associated, and can be seen to be potentially relevant to 
many schemata, instead of to a few only' (Abercrombie 1989, pp 79-80). 
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 The faq is a good example.  For more, see McKendree et al (1998), and compare Lave and 
Wenger's 1991) concept of 'legitimate peripheral participation'. 
28
 Dialogue is a central or fundamental educational form.  It was the core of the Socratic method, 
and forms much of the rationale of the seminar as used in contemporary higher education.  A 
number of writers treat dialogue as something different from, more or better than other kinds of 
collaborative communication such as discussion or negotiation.  Much contemporary theorising 
centres on Bakhtin, for whom 'Truth is not found inside the head of an individual person, it is born 
between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction' 
(Bakhtin, M M, Problems in Dostoevsky's Poetics, cit Visser (n d).  For an introduction to similar 
conceptions used by Freire, Gadamer, Habermas and Bohm, see Smith (2001). 
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becomes self-generating.
29
  Participants in a dialogue are not only learning from each other, but 
also learning something new.  In this way, the meeting is generative, constitutive not merely 
constative.  Something is being made in the process of meeting which is more than what was 
brought to it. 
 
Using a theatrical metaphor, Patricia Shaw (2002, ch 5) thinks of the way discussion emerges 
and evolves as a kind of ensemble improvisation.  Weick (1995) refers to sensemaking as jazz, 
also an improvised, ensemble form.  But what is it that is artful or creative about meeting and 
learning? 
 
language 
 
Learning in meetings is done in and through language, not least because different participants 
are members of different language communities (natural, disciplinary, professional).  Here, 
differences of natural language (English, French, Amharic) are probably least significant.  Native 
speakers know the difficulty of listening to those working in their second (or third or fourth) 
language (though they note, too, the felicitous word or phrase that only the non-native speaker 
might come upon).  By the same token, speakers of any natural language will recognise the 
anaesthetic effect of powerpoint. 
 
Meanwhile, discussion frequently involves coining new terms in which to express what has been 
newly recognized or identified.  For it (discussion) turns on the use or production of categories to 
describe cases, which is something we usually do no more than half-consciously.  Cross-national 
talk requires a creative, slightly more abstract grammar and vocabulary than the ones we might 
ordinarily use to talk about cases we know to those who also inhabit them.  Discussion is realized 
in what might be described as a 'third code', or a language of translation, and this is also partly 
why it often seems difficult, alien, disorientating as well as exhilarating. 
 
Bion (1961, p 187) sees the development of language in a group as evidence of high mental 
activity.  And there is yet a third order of sophistication in the way the language of the meeting 
evolves.  As Lester and Piore explain, initial communications are primitive, relatively clear and 
unambiguous, while later ones allow for increasing ambiguity: 'Language development evolves, in 
other words, toward the creation of interpretive space' (Lester and Piore 2004, p 71, emphasis in 
original).  This is entirely consistent with the transcripts Mead and Byers worked with, which 
revealed 'fragmented, ambiguous, incomplete sentences', pointing to a 'special kind of 
communication' having taken place (Mead and Byers 1968, p 13).  In learning by meeting as in 
language learning, the mark of improvement is the ability to distinguish between simply not 
understanding and understanding what is ambiguous. 
 
 
5 resolution 
 
How do meetings end?  They often end with proposals to meet again (meetings make meetings) 
or to otherwise stay in touch, to some how fix or hold on to some powerful, elusive experience.  
Participants speak hopefully of newsletters and email discussion lists, webpages and databases.  
Meanwhile, the questions asked in and by the meeting, the issues it has raised, the prospects 
advanced and the uncertainties and instabilities it has generated must be resolved in some way.  
This is the function of the report, sometimes something as elevated as an international 
'declaration', more often a summary or statement which may do no more than record (literally, 
document) the fact that the meeting has taken place. 
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This paper has developed a conception of the meeting here as a complex system of interactions 
between elements, where those elements are communications, not individuals or agencies.  It is 
a process, not a thing, event or episode; its properties are emergent, not defined a priori.  As they 
close, the issue arises of how this sense of emergence might be sustained. 
 
Towards the end of 1999, around 30 public health officials, researchers and representatives 
of interested organisations met in Gothenburg, Sweden to discuss Health Impact 
Assessment, then a new policy instrument being tried out in a number of different contexts 
around the world.
30
  The meeting was part of a broader HIA project led by WHO's European 
Centre for Health Policy.  'The project is a practically oriented learning-by-doing exercise 
involving many partners.  It is not expected to produce "guidelines" carved in stone, but to 
provide a flexible framework to encourage a broad exchange of information and a channel for 
the critical examination of experience'.
31
  The discussion was led by a paper which described 
some of the different models being explored in Bielefeld, Germany; by the British Medical 
Association; in Merseyside, England, and by Swedish local authorities.
32
  The paper also 
reviewed the health impact of the EU's Common Agriculture Policy, and looked at Social 
Impact Assessment in the US.  It worked by comparing and contrasting different cases, 
abstracting from them a number of issues for discussion.  On this basis what is described as 
a consensus paper was produced.
33
  The consensus paper is described as a 'living 
document': "The approach presented here will be discussed in a number of meetings and 
networks and, most importantly, will be tested and evaluated in practice in a number of pilot 
projects.  As a result it will be revised and updated in a continuous process of 
improvement".
34
  The paper was subsequently widely distributed and presented at a number 
of international and national level meetings, and has also been translated into languages 
other than English. 
 
Reporting is the end of a process of writing as much as talking; it is writing which has made 
meeting possible.  For meetings are realised at all only by the circulation and interrelationship of 
texts and documents, such as advertisements, invitations, emails, abstracts, timetables, briefing 
and discussion papers, flipcharts, minutes and press releases.  Meetings are produced through 
texts, and they draw on other texts, some of which stand for other meetings.  They are both 
generated by texts and generate new ones.  These texts make sense in relation to each other, 
which is to say that they make sense of each other (Freeman 2006b).
35
 
 
Moreover, once people no longer sit round a table (Arendt, above), it is the text which mediates 
between them.  The report does two things: first, it tells the group what it is by what it has done (it 
turns the meeting into a group), and second, it opens connections with other groups.  Like the 
papers presented in the course of the meeting, these processes are fundamentally connected.  
For a document is not just a conduit of knowledge and ideas, but a nexus of social practice 
(Brown and Duguid 1996).  Documents serve to coordinate behaviour as well as communicate 
information.  They provide groups with a common language and vocabulary, helping them 
express to others what it is they are trying to do.  In this way, the report mirrors the function of the 
presentations made at an earlier stage of the meeting: to the extent that articulation is both 
expression and connection, the report of a meeting is its collective re-articulation. 
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 Health Impact Assessment: from theory to practice. Report on the Leo Kaprio Workshop, 
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 Ritsatakis, A (2001) 'Developing an approach to Health Impact Assessment', ibid, p 3. 
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gene technology in the food chain used a network of documents to coordinate and stabilise the 
myriad activity which converged on and in the meeting. 
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Even at the most mundane level, 'concrete human action, know-how embodied in practice, 
persists and is transmitted only if it becomes symbolic.  To preserve its form, one must change its 
form – and then reconstitute it' (Weick 1995, p 125).   Minutes of meetings, plans, statements, 
agreements and press releases are all 'symbolic encodings' which enable actions to be 
reproduced in time.  Jerome Bruner (2000), drawing on Meyerson, writes of 'externalisation'.  
Meyerson's insight is that the purpose of collective activity is to produce works, oeuvres which 
achieve an existence of their own.  Bruner notes that the collective engagement entailed in 
creating such works  - a process of suggestion, negotiation and experiment - in effect creates the 
community which is in turn required to produce them: 'Works and works-in-progress create 
shared and negotiable ways of thinking in a group'.  The text and the group are mutually 
constitutive; each is defined in terms of the other. 
 
What this implies, following the argument of the preceding section (construction, above), is that a 
key purpose of the document is not to fix meaning, but to make continuing interpretation possible, 
to reproduce and extend the interactions it promotes.  Similarly, the purpose of those interactions 
is to reproduce the text; not to replicate or copy it but to help it live on through adaptation and 
interpretation. 
 
 
conclusion 
 
How, then, should we think of learning by meeting?  We might begin by returning to the different 
perspectives on learning outlined early in this paper. 
 
Those who attend meetings do so for a purpose.  What matters here is that the instrumentality 
and autonomy accorded the rational actor is a condition of learning.  The rationalist perspective is 
valid, but provides only a partial account of what goes on in meetings of the kind I describe here.  
For the purpose of the meeting is to discover purposes (in the same way as we shop to discover 
what we want or need).  What is brought to meetings are not lessons, but fragments of 
experience subject to interpretation by all those present, including the subjects of that experience.  
Lessons are collectively drawn and derived: they are opportunities for interpretation before they 
are guides to action. 
 
The meeting itself is an institution.  Meetings are normal things: participants almost invariably 
know what to do there.  Meetings are fuzzy sets of variations on standard behaviours, so 
standard that we take them for granted.
36
  The learning I have described here takes place in a 
particular institutional form but, importantly, one that is outside normal organizational routine.  
This implies, in turn, that certain kinds of meeting might be more about learning than others, and 
that these will be those that follow the fewest rules with the widest range of interpretations and 
applications.  To that extent, perhaps there is no 'meeting itself'. 
 
This suggests, in turn that the meeting is at the same time a social construct, a frame or form 
peculiarly generative of other social constructs.  In this paper, I have tried to indicate here the 
construction of what is being learned as it is being learned, including the rules for meeting.  And 
somewhere behind or within the social construct is a distinctive form of practice, a process or 
pattern of thought-in-action.  It is fundamental to policy making because it is the means by which 
policy makers and practitioners 'negotiate the world' (Wagenaar and Cook 2003, p 143).  In their 
introduction to ideas about practice in public policy, Wagenaar and Cook argue that it is '[A]n 
important and distinct dimension of politics, with its own logic (pragmatic, purposeful), its own 
standards of knowing (interpretative, holistic, more know-how than know-that), its own orientation 
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towards the world (interactive, moral, emotional), and its own image of society (as a constellation 
of interdependent communities)' (Wagenaar and Cook 2003, p 141).  This is as good an account 
of meeting as it is of practice, and the best invitation we could have to think of meetings in this 
way. 
 
Where does this leave the practitioner or participant?  Our common sense of the meeting would 
have it as something like a market, where knowledge goods are traded and exchanged.  Some 
package of knowledge or experience, or both, is brought to the table by the seller, debated 
among potential buyers, and taken or left.  This conception is ultimately mechanistic, assuming 
that what is or might be learned exists independently of the meeting and prior to it.  But another 
way of thinking would have the meeting as an arena of production, more like a factory, or perhaps 
a garden.  Policy knowledge does not exist somewhere else in finished form, ready to be 
transferred, but is finished or even produced in the act of transfer.  The knowledge with which the 
meeting is concerned is the output of a series of communications, not its input.  This conception 
is organic: the issue is one of germination, grafting, and fertilization as much as 'dissemination'.  
The meeting is dialogic, not monologic. 
 
What are the implications of this second way of thinking?  Ordinary assumptions about cross-
national learning are largely mechanistic, though the practice of communication and exchange is 
often one much better described as organic.
37
  This means that the theory espoused by a 
participant may often run counter to his or her theory-in-use.  Opportunities for learning may be 
missed because they go unseen, because the learning which is done is difficult to understand, 
express and report in the terms ordinarily available for doing so. 
 
Learning by meeting is more like language learning than learning facts, figures or tables.  In 
essence, the argument here is that learning is done in a 'third code', or language of translation.  
The definition (which is a redefinition) of its subject matter is often the end-point of discussion: 
meetings are fundamentally concerned with the definition of the problem they are designed to 
address, and it is in this sense that they can be said to be performative.  We construct common 
objects of interest through discussion: we learn with others as much as from others.
38
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